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Introduction 
 
hilosophers who write about the meaning of life are few nowadays.  The 
subject has lost its attractiveness.  Perceived from a viewpoint of logical 
positivism or language philosophy, the whole issue of meaningfulness 
seems rather pointless.  It is often considered to be related to metaphysics, 
making it less suitable for philosophical inquiry.  The topic of meaningfulness 
seems too intangible.  Indeed, the few philosophers that have embarked on 
examining meaningfulness have proven to be well aware of the challenges this 
poses.  At times they acknowledge that the more they concentrate on the 
subject, the more it seems to fall apart into unintelligible pieces about which 
nothing of philosophical value can be said.1 
 And yet, on a personal level, the questions of why people live and 
how to live a meaningful life are so central to humanity that at one point it will 
inevitably emerge in anybody’s life.  The modern condition is such that people 
spend most of their days doing routine activities, hurrying from one place to 
another.  However, this routine is interrupted, at unexpected or expected 
moments, by familiar and personal milestones: a birth or death in the family, a 
new job, or simply somebody turning thirty, forty or fifty.  Such moments may 
inspire people to reflect on their life and make them see it from a different 
viewpoint, one that encompasses a larger, external reality.   
The question of a meaningful life and its implications is something 
that everyone will have to face one way or another.  This requires a 
philosophical examination to widen and deepen understanding.  Although the 
answers may be incomplete, raising questions and facing issues may provide a 
firm grasp on its implications.   
The following parts will first summarise the existing viewpoints on 
meaningfulness: the religious one; the current that believes meaningfulness is a 
matter of choice and preferences; and the third that takes ‘objective values that 
are appealing’ as a standard.  It is mainly the latter viewpoint that is of interest 
to our discussion.  It makes it possible to bring back insights into 
                                                 
1 An overview of the literature on meaningfulness see E. D. Klemke and  Steven M.  
Cahn, The meaning of life.  A Reader (USA: Oxford University Press, 2008), in Philosophical Papers, 
34:3 (2005) and more recently in The Monist, 93:1(2010). 
P  
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meaningfulness that have become obscured over time, such as the passivity of 
responding to something and being touched by something.  It also offers 
opportunities to expand on these themes. 
 
Different Approaches to Meaningfulness 
 
One of the philosophers associating meaningfulness with religion is 
John Cottingham.   In his book On the Meaning of Life,2 he declares that the 
scientific assertions about the origin of man, i.e.  that man was made of star 
dust, are considered mere facts.  Yet these assertions subtly but undeniably 
influence man's view of himself, the world as well as the meaning of his 
existence.  Scientific findings make the world appear to him in mechanistic 
terms and hence as predominantly irrational, blind, lifeless and devoid of 
meaning.  As a result, the world strikes man as a place of arbitrariness where 
nothing really matters.  Cottingham counterbalances this disenchanting wave of 
scientific ‘facts’ with religion.  To him, religious discourses grope towards 
meanings that are beyond the framework of methodical knowledge.  They 
reach beyond the strictly knowable—but not beyond the thinkable—and aim 
to place human life within a context of significance and meaning.  Even though 
this richness cannot be fully captured in scientific language, it can still be made 
manifest or disclosed.  Despite the lack of ultimate evidence, it can offer “the 
hope to find a home.”3  
  Cottingham keenly argues in favour of the possibility of giving religion 
a place within the scientific model of evolution.  His main drive stems from the 
assertion that without religion no deep meaning is possible.  A religious view 
allows our life to be attuned to an order that is both creative and good.  Hence, 
to Cottingham, a deep sense of meaningfulness is inherently related to ethics 
and religion.  This is achieved when man finds himself within an eternal and 
ethical framework.   
  Without saying it in so many words, Cottingham seems to believe that 
without religion meaningfulness can only result in personal preferences and 
choices.  Cottingham follows Nietzsche when he argues that, if religion is a 
fantasy, an illusion, a lost comfort, meaning will have to be found within, in 
man's own will.  This means that the foundations of people's decisions and 
beliefs are to be found in their inner selves.   
  The perspective of meaning as being rooted in personal preference is 
very powerful especially today.  It is intrinsically related to the idea of personal 
autonomy because of people's will, consciousness and their ability to provide 
meaning to the world.  The preference logic, which has had a great influence 
on modern ideas on meaningfulness, is mainly inspired by the utilitarian way of 
thinking worked out, inter alia, in the philosophical liberalism of John Steward 
Mill.4 It has since been reflected in many ‘—isms’, such as libertarianism, 
                                                 
2 John Cottingham, On the Meaning of Life (London: Routledge, 2003). 
3 Ibid., 16. 
4 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (London: Longman, Roberts & Green, 1869).  
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relativism or postmodernism.  The following brief incursion into political 
philosophy aims to shed light on its roots.   
  According to philosophical liberalism, it is a violation of people's 
fundamental interests to impose a specific view of what should be considered 
the good life.  Freedom of choice is necessary to find out what is valuable in 
life—to form, examine and revise beliefs about value.  It is assumed that 
people cannot be wrong in their choices; choices are arbitrary and cannot be 
rationally criticised.  The main purpose in life is to be or to feel happy and it is 
up to every individual what that means.  So the question of what people should 
desire in general terms is not deemed legitimate.  On the contrary, freedom of 
choice and different conceptions of the good are presumed to lead to cultural 
richness and to further individual autonomy, precisely because of the 
oppositional character of some of these.  According to this perception, choice 
and meaning come from within man, for liberal philosophy insists that people 
have an ability to detach themselves from any particular social practice or 
context and that no particular practice has any authority that is beyond 
individual judgement and rejection. 
  The discussion has lost some of its edge, thanks to authors such as 
Charles Taylor5 and Will Kymlicka.6 They have shown that preferences and 
choices are never really ‘pure’ from within.  People are inherently embedded in 
discursive and social contexts which influence their underlying ontological 
assumptions, their self-understanding, their ‘choices’ of what they do and do 
not consider meaningful.  Liberal philosophy is no exception to this: it cannot 
free itself from a framework.  Indeed, both Taylor and Kymlicka have brought 
to the fore some of the implicit elementary liberal assumptions.  These include 
the deeply rooted ideas of the need for individuals to explore their inner 
depths, the intrinsic autonomy and intrinsic moral worth of individuals, or the 
postulation that people are social by nature and will use their freedom to strive 
for common goods.7 In other words, the idea of choice proves also to be built 
up within a substantial discourse that orientates people's self-understanding in 
a more or les specific direction.  It automatically yields an idea of how to act 
and of how to act meaningfully, providing a set of meanings to go by, to make 
choices in life, and for people to find out who they are and where they want to 
go. 
   Political philosophers have rightly pointed out that meaningfulness 
exists thanks to the appeal of cultural contexts.  This brings us to the third 
approach in the realm of the philosophy of meaningfulness, the one that 
asserts that meaningfulness is brought about by contexts, works, values and the 
like that are appealing.  One author who follows this line of thought is Susan 
                                                 
5 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self.  The Making of Modern Identity (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989). 
6 Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy. An introduction (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002). 
7 Ibid., 217.  
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Wolf.8 In a more analytical manner, she states that meaning is found and given 
based on a complex relation between subjectivity and objectivity.   
  Wolf starts from the assumption that an individual cannot but perceive 
the world in terms of value.  Meaningfulness seems an indispensable 
component of a good life, even if people usually do not express their lives and 
the world in these terms.  Paradigmatic examples of what makes up 
meaningfulness are vocations, close relationships, worthwhile projects and 
commitments.  Activities or relationships are not valuable because people 
perceive them as such.  They appreciate them simply because they consider 
them meaningful.  This insight is very close to another line in meaningfulness, 
elaborated by Nagel.  According to this author, meaningfulness is not 
something humans can simply bring about in their lives, even though they have 
a certain ability to influence the process of meaning.  Yet, whether acts, 
persons, and projects are meaningful or not can neither be simply chosen nor 
commanded by any individual.  As Wolf states, it is rather a question of feeling, 
being called by vocations or drawn into relationships.9 People respond to and are 
attracted by something that they consider objectively appealing. 
 
Being Bound to the Horizon 
 
  In this section the possibilities of this third ‘line’ of meaningfulness 
will be explored further, for it creates an opening towards ‘passivity’ without 
questioning autonomy.  What do notions such as being called by something or 
drawn into something mean? These notions presuppose the perception of the 
evocative and the being touched.  ‘Evocative’ and ‘being touched’ in relation to 
meaningfulness are easily associated with religion.  A possible non-religious 
context of the evocative and the being touched has remained largely 
underexplored so far.  Yet, it is of central importance to understand the 
genuine functioning of meaningfulness in people’s lives.  It offers the 
possibility to grasp why worthwhile projects, vocations and so on are 
appealing.  As will be shown later, they can only be so if they have an elusive, 
evocative character. 
Furthermore, once the idea of something that appeals is accepted, the 
opportunity arises to retrieve and fully grasp what Heidegger called the being-
in-the-world.  As Heidegger10 already pointed out, modern man fails to achieve 
a deep insight into his primordial relation with the world.  Heidegger was 
referring to the ‘fact’ that people have always been and will always be a part of 
the world.  They are not disengaged subjects but they are in a state of Dasein, of 
being-in-the-world, of inherent embeddedness.  They have a broad range of 
                                                 
8 Susan Wolf, “Happiness and Meaning.  Two aspects of the Good Life,” in Social 
Philosophy and Policy, 14:1 (1997), 207-225.   
9 Susan Wolf, “Meaning and Morality,” in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, XCVII 
(1997), 299-315. 
10 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. by J.  Stambaugh (Albany: State University 
of New York Press, 1996).  
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faculties at their disposal to approach the world—to gain access and relate to 
it—which include, but are by no means limited to, cognitive capacities. 
  However, due to the significant role that has been assigned to the 
sciences since the onset of the disenchantment wave, the influence of this 
cognitive capacity has increased.  Society has now reached a point where other 
approaches to reality have simply ceased to be visible.  They are not considered 
worthwhile anymore.  As Cottingham rightly remarks, it is because of the 
prevalence of ‘why’ questions that certain answers predominate.11 ‘Why’ 
questions try to disclose the hidden world, and although they yield an ocean of 
knowledge, they can also cut off our access to other domains of thought and 
experience.  It is thus that the perception of the surrounding world as a 
horizon has been lost.  Disenchantment has had a flattening effect on man's 
perception of the world.12 In the disenchanted system of meaning that 
determines the relation with the world, the world is perceived as tangible, 
measurable and knowable—at least in principle. 
  Society has not been able to fully regain this potential experience of 
non-tangibility in an adapted way, notwithstanding many philosophical 
attempts and groundbreaking works.  As we will try to show, the ability to see 
the world as that which surrounds man, more specifically as man's natural 
horizon, may contribute to retrieving a deeper sense of meaningfulness. 
  As stated, the full implications of such embedding have not yet been 
adequately incorporated into modern thinking.  Nonetheless, several authors 
have made interesting contributions elaborating on Heidegger’s insights.   
Taylor, for instance, extensively developed the implications of this for 
meaningfulness in the context of ethics.13 Aiming to retrieve the idea of a 
horizon, he meticulously articulated an ethical horizon.  He likewise hinted at 
what could be called a natural horizon (making space for our embeddedness in 
nature) and a social horizon (indicating our 3D embedding in the social world) 
as possible articulations for such a notion.  Again, for these horizons to regain 
their full meaning, their perception should go beyond the merely cognitive.  A 
meaningful relation towards the world is not about the disclosure of knowledge 
but about brief manifestations of something evocative that recedes almost the 
moment it appears, transforming the experience into a subtly enhanced 
understanding—which is not the same as objective knowledge.   
  The following two descriptions aim to illustrate the implications of the 
recognition of a wider horizon.  In the first situation, the horizon is fully 
ignored.  In the second, the recognition of its existence is allowed to dawn.  
Both descriptions take the societal horizon as one possible articulation of the 
horizon.  The shift from a ‘flattened’ view of the world to a 3D view 
constitutes a transformation that is fundamental to meaning because it makes 
for enhanced meaningfulness.  Particular attention is paid to the importance of 
being situated and the process of shifting meaning. 
                                                 
11 Cottingham, op cit., 17. 
12 Charles Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity (Cambridge, Massachusets, London: 
Harvard University Press, 1991), 69. 
13 See Taylor, Sources of the Self.  
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From a Social World to a Social Horizon 
 
The notions ‘social world’ or ‘social horizon’ do not refer to the close 
circle of friends and family.  They rather embrace society as a whole.  Different 
perspectives of these notions are possible.  Mainstream worldview and 
discourses encourage basic principles like efficiency.  This is unwittingly 
conducive to instrumental and functional interaction between people.  Society 
is taken to be something ‘out there’ made up of unknown people and 
depersonalised institutions.  Exaggeratingly, people may take the services they 
receive from others for granted and perceive them as self-evidently at their 
disposal to pursue their own goals.  Those who adopt such a stance, engage in 
a one—way relationship.  The intentionality of the act flows from society 
towards the individual.  The individual tries to ‘gain’ something from society 
and attempts to have society do something for them.  They will feel no 
obligation or responsibility towards society for they think of it in de—
humanised terms.  Cultural embedding and the horizon aspects are 
incongruous things to them.  They are incapable to grasp in depth the historical 
dimension of society, failing to acknowledge the previous generations of 
people that have helped give shape to today's society.  They rather perceive 
society as a construction in terms of the here and now.  This kind of 
perception towards society can be called ‘flattened’ and one—dimensional 
 Besides this instrumental and functional view of society, there is the 
possibility of people widening their perspective.  As a matter of fact, in these 
days a growing awareness of this horizon can be discerned.  Policy-makers and 
other people in the political arena have begun to recognise the relation between 
awareness of a societal horizon, social cohesion and an increase in well—being.  
That is why Belgium, to give but one example, aims to enable people to have 
the kind of experiences that may foster such recognition.  Examples are 
government—sponsored local community breakfasts or annual barbecue 
parties in the central square of a village or town.  The relevance of such events 
is not so much that they can create a different atmosphere, but rather that they 
satisfy the minimum condition for ‘openness’ towards the community or 
society.  Individuals with an instrumental outlook, i.e.  those who take their 
community and other people’s services for granted, are likely to go through a 
kind of experience that is very much unlike what they are used to.  The 
intentionality of the experience has another flavour—another meaning—even 
if still flowing towards the individual.  Their usual notion of 'self-evidently 
obtaining’ something from society may well start to make room for a sense of 
non-intentional ‘receiving’.  The moment this inversion in intentionality is 
sensed is crucial.  It creates a feeling of belonging, of being part of, of being 
situated.  This can open the door for people to discover greater depths in their 
relationship with the social environment.  When this shift in meaning happens, 
they can recognise their embeddedness in a social horizon (a 3D dimension).   
Such an initial opening—up may be followed by similar experiences, 
allowing the individuals concerned to start to grasp the social and historical  
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dimensions of life, as well as the intensity and the enhanced meaningfulness 
this may bring about.  A changed perception—a significant change in 
meaning—can happen on an implicit or on an explicit level, while the 
meaningfulness is further enhanced by subsequent reflection. 
The notion of enhanced meaningfulness does not fit in readily with 
the currently well-established discourse of personal preferences and choices.  
Nor is it related to the subject—object ontology that is still prevailing over 
other views.  Prior to a more detailed analysis of the transition in meaning that 
accompanies this shift from non-recognition to recognition, it may therefore 
be interesting to try and obtain a fuller understanding of what this transition 
does to an individual, in terms of their awareness of being situated in this 
horizon.  Subsequently, the structure of the shift in meaning can be analysed so 
as to make clear why it can be considered a successful shift. 
 
The Inarticulate Awareness of Situatedness 
 
While people's initial dim recognition of ‘receiving’ will not 
substantially change their ways of acting and experiencing, its effect may 
increase with further experiences of a similar nature.  An important outcome 
may be a sense of embeddedness or situatedness.  One author whose ideas 
help explain this notion, which, after all, is hardly self-evident, is Heidegger.  
Scrutinising the notion of being-in-the-world, Heidegger described the 
fundamental difference between the ways people relate to their surrounding 
space, and the way that things do.  According to him, because of people's 
Dasein, they are inherently in search of a sense of familiarity with this space.  
They experience it as an enveloping world rather than as empty space.   
Heidegger exemplified this sense of familiarity by way of a step by step analysis 
of people's encounters with the surrounding objects.  He did not describe these 
objects as ‘things’ people are looking at (and which is not the way they perceive 
them anyway) but as useful things.  These useful things are by nature something in 
order to, they always contain a reference of something to something.  Heidegger gave 
the example of how a pen refers to ink, to paper, to desk, to furniture, to room.  
He insisted that people do not perceive these ‘things’ one by one, that they do 
not simply add them up to an entire space.  Rather, “what people experience as 
nearest to them, although they do not grasp it thematically, is the room itself.  
This is not what is ‘between the four walls’ in a geometrical, spatial sense, but 
rather a[s ] material for living.”14  
  Heidegger then proceeded to discuss the specific example of a 
hammer as a ‘useful thing’ and its unarticulated meaning.  This quality of ‘being 
there in order to’ gives the hammer a kind of familiarity.  When people use it 
for hammering, its handiness is revealed15, its ‘being—in—itself’, which is 
different from merely occurring.  This handiness is not apparent from its 
                                                 
14 Ibid., 64. 
15 “Handiness is the ontological categorical definition of beings as they are ‘in 
themselves’.” Ibid., 67.  
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outward appearance.  People cannot discover it by merely looking at it.  They 
cannot find out the handiness of useful things through any theorising by way 
of their objectifying capacity.  The only way to find this out is by actually using 
them, and the only way to know that they are useful is through association.  
Because people see useful things and associate them with their handiness to 
themselves, the result is a multitude of references of the type of ‘in-order-to’.  
Heidegger called this kind of perception circumspection  (Umsicht, or ‘looking-
about’).16 
  Access to the handiness of a useful thing may seem self-evident, but 
this is not so.  One characteristic is that the useful thing is hardly present at all 
when being used.  It withdraws.  For example, while hammering, people do not 
concentrate on the hammer itself, but on what it is being used for.  People 
focus on the work they have to finish, on the production.  The activity holds 
the totality of references in which useful things are encountered.  Hence, the 
‘what-for’ is first and foremost.  There is yet another reason why access is not 
self-evident.  People recognise the handiness the moment the useful thing, the 
hammer, becomes unusable.  This happens when “the constitutive reference of 
the in-order-to to a what—for has been disturbed.”17 The wider context of the 
useful thing (the hammer referring to the nail, to the impossibility of finishing 
the work, and to the work) then becomes apparent.  This is not something 
never recognised before but a totality that was included in our circumspection 
from the very beginning.   
  However, this disturbance causes the hammer to be thematised and 
objectively present through people's cognitive capacity.  Its ‘practical’ behaviour is 
transformed to ‘theoretical’ behaviour and the enchantment of interiorisation is 
broken.  Theoretical observation of the thing makes it impossible to have 
adequate access to its handiness.  People can never gain conscious access to the 
interiorised meaning of things. 
  What is the relevance of this to situatedness in a social horizon? 
Contrary to the prevailing ideas of meaning as a subjective condition of well-
being based on personal preferences and choices, Heidegger showed that man's 
Dasein (being there) is ontically constituted by being-in-the-world.  People exist 
as being-in-the-world.  When they are able to make the transition from a one-
dimensional view of the social world to the 3D concept of a social horizon (as 
a ‘result’ of experiences of receiving), this horizon briefly lights up again.  It 
becomes apparent again, in an unarticulated manner.  Similarly to the situation 
of the hammer and the room, in a very literal sense people become aware of a 
part of reality they had not noticed before.  There is, as it were, ‘more world’ 
with meaning.  It is as if they suddenly become aware of the room—the 
horizons—they have been working in, not in any theoretical way of 
conceptualising the four walls, its floor and ceiling.  People become aware of its 
spatial presence and of their having been in it all this time.  It will place their 
life in a different, broader perspective.  Yet, more space having meaning is not 
                                                 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid., 70.  
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the only reason why there is meaningfulness.  Becoming aware of being bound 
up to this horizon, and always having been so (rather than perceiving 
themselves as detached), is at the same time an affirmation, it is an affirmation 
of the right to be in this space.  This affirmation does not function on the level 
of the ego, but rather on the existential level.   
  The social horizon is only accessible because it lights up in ’thinking’, 
as a condition for existence.  However, it does not light up in the same way as 
the quality of a useful thing does, i.e.  at a moment of a disturbed relation.  It 
lights up precisely because it touches.  Hence both ‘processes’—disturbance and 
being touched by something—centre on the same kind of shift in meaning. 
  If the implicit recognition of the horizons warrants increased 
meaningfulness, the reverse—flattened awareness—should come with 
decreased meaningfulness.  This seems true.  As pointed out, if people have a 
flattened worldview, if they are cut off from this wider horizon and if they 
relate to the world only in instrumental terms, the result will be a loss of 
meaning.  These ‘facts’ have been studied in other disciplines as well.  One 
psychological reason for decreased meaning appears to be fear—collective fear.  
In current society, the fear to enter the world, literally, decreases meaning.   
British research commissioned by the Children’s Society and Frank Ferudi18 
have shown that in 1970 a child aged about eight could wander up to about 
840 metres from their home.  In 1997 this was reduced to 280 metres, and in 
2007 to 20 metres.  Parents will allow their children to play in the garden of 
their own home, but not beyond.  The main reason for this spatial isolation is 
that the parents fear their children may fall victim to traffic accidents, but even 
m o r e  s o ,  t h a t  t h e y  m a y  b e  k i d n a p p e d .   P e o p l e  n o w a d a y s  h a v e  f a r  l e s s  
confidence in their neighbours and in people in general, even though this is not 
borne out by statistics. 
  People’s relationship with their social world has drastically changed, 
but the same can be said of the relationship with nature.19 In a literal sense, 
young people are deprived of the opportunity to have meaningful encounters 
with the world, including nature, to be touched by it, to sense the interrelated 
meanings of things.  Direct physical contact is taught to be avoided.  Intimacy 
with the world is gone.  Consequently, the impact of fear on their sense of 
meaningfulness is substantial.  Only without fear can they fully recognise this 
horizon and continue to be a part of it—as Cottingham puts it, to feel ‘at 
home’ in it.  It is thus that a basic layer of broader meaningfulness can be 
created. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18 Frank Ferudi, Paranoid Parenting, (Allen Lane, Penguin, 2001.) 
19 See for example the 2008 bestseller Louv, R., Last Child in the Woods’ Saving our 
children from Nature-deficit disorder (Chapel Hill: Algonguin Paperbacks, 2008).  
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How Can the Shift from Non-Recognition to Recognition of 
the Horizon be Successful? 
 
So far, the recognition of the broader horizon and a sense of enhanced 
meaningfulness have been associated with each other, because they were 
supposed to further the sense of situatedness and affirmation.  As mentioned; 
the act of recognising is not merely cognitive.  It rather refers to the broader 
faculties of relating and understanding, of which the cognitive activity is only a 
part.  Here, ‘recognising’ and ‘being aware’ also refer to the susceptibility to 
being touched.  This final part of this article analyses why being touched—or 
being appealed—is so important for meaningfulness.  The outcome may be 
that this experience can be said to drive a successful shift from a non-
recognition to a recognition of the horizon.   
  As said, Heidegger believed that the underlying, interiorised meaning 
of the world and its elements, such as a tool, can light up when their use is 
disturbed or obstructed.  In the case of the horizon, it was suggested that it is 
not only a disturbance that is involved.  People can also get touched.  Both 
seemingly contradictory elements are at the heart of meaning and its increase as 
well as its decrease.  How can an experience of being touched successfully lead 
to meaningfulness? This is not so evident as it may seem.  For all somebody's 
willingness to recognise the horizons as depicted above, with one simple 
cognitive ‘click’ they can likewise decide to consider them meaningless, 
theoretical  spielerei.  Indeed, if they place themselves, their activities, their 
surrounding world in an ever—widening context, there comes a moment that 
they run the risk of losing meaning.  Hence, a sentence like ‘situatedness is a 
core element of meaningfulness’, can be broken down into questions such as: 
‘to what extent do people need to be situated’; ‘what’s the point if all people are 
going to die anyway?’ The analyses by Nagel and Nozick20 show that 
something felt to be meaningful in a particular, limited context may lose its 
appeal in a different, broader context.  Nozick in particular has made clear that 
the underlying orientation of people’s desire to live a meaningful life is usually 
towards infinity.  No a priori assumptions can be made about any limits to the 
process of ever—widening situatedness or recontextualisation.  Here the key 
elements of a successful shift come into the picture, because although the 
desire for meaning seems directed at the infinite, it must necessarily be 
reconciled with the finite.  If it were not, the lives of people would eventually 
be futile and void of meaning.  The question then is how and at what particular 
moment in the process this desire towards infinity should stop.  At what point 
should it be reconciled with the finite? Nagel’s answer is that everybody will 
have to decide for themselves where to draw the line, i.e.  ‘to begin and end 
somewhere in the middle of things’.  Nagel means to say that the current 
worldview is inclined to give credit to theoretical behaviour, i.e.  the external 
perspective or cognitive objectifying capacity, at the expense of the internal 
                                                 
20 See Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (USA: Oxford University Press, 1989) and 
Robert Nozick, The Examined Life (New York: touchstone, Simon & Schluster, 1989).  
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perspective.  It will always remain possible for valuable projects to be looked 
upon as arbitrary.  However, this should not—or no longer—be overstressed.  
The external perspective is not decisive itself but it is allowed to be so by 
people.  It can be changed when the way it is viewed is changed.  It is therefore 
up to people to reconsider its influence and readjust it, if appropriate, to steer 
its successful outcome. 
  Nagel’s answer, for all its sound argumentation, strikes as 
unsatisfactory, because it implies that the process of meaningfulness ultimately 
comes down to mere individual choice.  Although Nagel has a point, it is only 
part of the story.  Arnold Burms21 provides an alternative approach to the 
subject based on an analysis of the aesthetical experience.  Burms highlights 
two aspects of this experience.  First he observes that people's appreciation of 
a work of art that touches them is essentially characterised by a degree of 
passivity.  People are touched, appealed or moved by something that they are 
impressed by and that they look up to in admiration.  The second aspect is the 
phenomenon that an appealing work of art is evocative.  A touching piece of 
art calls up something that seems to defy full articulation.  A work of art that 
touches far exceeds its material presence.  If people look at such a painting as 
Van Gogh’s ‘A pair of shoes’, they will understand that the details signify 
something that they can never fully utter.  They cannot deduce their 
significance by analysing the form and colours of the painting.  The more they 
reflect on the work of art, the more its touching quality escapes its tangible 
reality.  Yet, in order to experience its broader meaning, its concrete presence is 
indispensable.  Its material reality and ungraspable meaning are inherently 
interconnected.  The more a work of art touches, the more it seems to connect 
to something inarticulate and the stronger it will draw people’s attention to 
itself and to its own concrete existence.22 
  This insight can be applied to the conception of the social horizon.  
Meaningfulness through recognition of the social horizon has initially been 
created by a shift in meaning.  This is a shift from non-recognition to 
recognition of a 3D perspective.  Phenomenologically, this leads to a broader 
world in almost a literal sense, and likewise to a broader based meaningfulness.  
However, as said, there is also the possibility of shifts leading to a sense of 
meaninglessness when re—contextualisation is placed in too broad a 
perspective.  So why can it said to be successful? Two core elements of 
meaningfulness converge.  First, recognition of the horizons occurs outside the 
cognitive faculty but is triggered by an experience of being touched by them.  It 
is not a matter of inventing but of rediscovering.  The evocative element of 
being touched enables never—ending shifts in meaning—the desire of 
meaning is directed at the infinite—while it is reconciled with the finite—the 
horizon.  Like the work of art, the notion of ‘horizon’ has a kind of finiteness.  
The term ‘a kind of’ is to be taken literally, for the horizon is not so tangible as 
                                                 
21 Arnold Burms, “Humanisme en Ervaring van Zin,” in G. Van Der Wal & F.  Jacogs 
eds., Vragen naar zin.  Beschouwingen over zingevingsproblematiek (Baarn: Ambo, 1992).   
22 Ibid., 63.  
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a work of art.  Yet it allows a sufficient degree of conceptualisation for it to be 
finite.  The shift is successful because it strikes as valuable both in its tangible 
limitations and in its connection to the infinite possibilities of 
recontextualisation. 
 
Center Leo Apostel, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Belgium 
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